Abstract. Countries across the globe are in a continual competition for capital. Diaspora populationsmigrants residing outside of their country of birth-are a source of both financial capital in the form of potential remittances and human capital in the form of their education, connections, and skills.
migrant's attempt to open new trade routes, discover new markets and locate raw materials.
Economically successful émigrés would often endeavor to have family and friends join them by sending money back home. Today the importance of migrants as a source of external capital is at least, if not more, important. Migrants are increasingly part of the global supply chain and are consumers of products manufactured in their homeland. They act as entrepreneurs, exploiting informational advantages when they invest in and trade with their home countries (Rauch and Trinidad 2002; Leblang 2010) . And, like their ancestors centuries earlier, migrants funnel capital directly back to their families and friends through remittances. In more concrete terms the World Bank estimates that in 2008 and 2009 migrant remittances exceeded 400 billion USD-a staggering amount especially when one recalls that this was the height of the financial crisis (World Bank 2011) 1 . These fundstransferred from family member to family member-are often used to facilitate investments in land, new home construction, businesses, agriculture and equipment (Ratha, et al 2011). 2 At the macro level scholars have found that remittances play an important role in shaping a country's exchange rate regime preferences (Singer 2010) as well as influencing the survival of leaders within autocratic regimes (Ahmed 2012 ).
In addition to being a source of entrepreneurial and financial capital, migrants also embody human capital as they often return home with work experience, education, and/or foreign contacts on top of any accrued financial savings. The reintegration of these returnees into the home country's labor market generates positive externalities for the local economy as a whole because upon return they can facilitate the adoption of new technologies and disseminate "best practices" in their fields (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008) .
Home countries have deployed any number of strategies to engage their diasporas and entice them to remit their human physical capital. These range from the creation of government agencies focusing on their citizens abroad to the establishment of hometown associations which engage expatriates in their new communities. 3 While useful, these strategies require an already organized and engaged diaspora as well as efficient administrative structures. Another strategy, utilized with growing frequency since 1980 (see Figure 1 ), is extension of extraterritorial or dual citizenship rights. By treating citizens abroad as part of their "extended-nation," home countries attempt to increase the likelihood that their expatriates repatriate both financial capital in the form of remittances and the human capital embodied in themselves upon their return.
Whether dual citizenship rights actually encourage expatriates to remit and/or return to the homeland is the question motivating this paper. I argue that by extending dual citizenship politics, homeland successfully harness the human and material capital of their expatriates. This occurs not only because dual citizenship is a symbolic statement of home country attachment to the diaspora but also because dual citizenship decreases the transactions costs associated with entering a host country's labor market and makes it easier for migrants to return home. Utilizing both migrant surveys carried out in a number of host countries and broad panel data I find that countries dual citizenship rights are an important part of a country's diaspora engagement strategy: expatriates are ten-percent more likely to remit and three-percent more likely to return to those countries that offer dual citizenship rights. At the aggregate level dual citizenship doubles, and in some cases triples, the dollar amount of remittances received by a home country.
In addition to these important substantive findings, this paper contributes to the literatures in political economy and migration in a number of ways. First, it adds to a small but growing political economy scholarship that examines how migrant networks facilitate the cross-border flow of trade, aid and investment (e.g., Rauch and Trindade 2002; Leblang 2010) . While that literature emphasizes the importance of migrant networks it ignores the role played by sending states. Second, the lion's share of research on immigration policy focuses on the politics of immigration citizenship and/or assimilation in the receiving or host societies (e.g., Howard 2009 ). There is little, if any, systematic empirical work focusing on the emigration policies of sending states. 4 Third, the literature that focuses on the consequences of migration for home countries focuses mostly on the "brain drain" and has been concerned with the consequences of immigration for human capital development in the sending state, not on the ways that sending countries can encourage return migration (e.g., Kapur and McHale 2005) . By focusing on extra territorial citizenship as a strategy of expatriate engagement this paper begins to fill these gaps.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section one I develop the argument and hypotheses linking dual citizenship to migrant remittances and return. In so doing I also discuss some possible causes of dual citizenship; something necessary for the instrumental variables analysis of section four. The samples and statistical methods used to test these hypotheses are discussed in section two. Section three presents the results for the effect of dual citizenship on remittances and return migration using migrant surveys while section 4 The only paper I know of fitting this category examines the costs associated with obtaining a passport (McKenzie 2007) .
four focuses on remittances using macro data for a large panel of countries. Section five concludes.
Dual Citizenship, Remittances and Return
National citizenship connotes a set of exclusive rights and responsibilities that apply to members of a country's political community; a community that is generally defined by a nation's territorial borders. Citizens of a country often have the right to own property, are eligible for employment public education and other social programs and, in democracies, are often vested with the right to vote. With these rights come obligations including, but not limited, taxation and, in some cases, compulsory military service. Citizenship is, therefore, a political construction with implications for social and economic life. Having dual or multiple citizenship allows an individual to possess political and economic rights in multiple countries and it often presents the citizen with the ability to enter the workforce. From the perspective of an immigrant, dual citizenship is advantageous as it eliminates the need to obtain a visa to return home and allows the expatriate an opportunity to own property and make other personal investments in her homeland.
The international norm of the 19 th and 20 th centuries held that individuals should denounce home country citizenship rights before naturalizing in another country; holding multiple citizenships was seen as a moral failing. US Ambassador to Germany, George Bancroft, famously remarked that states should "as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries; as soon bear with polygamy as that state of double allegiance which common sense so repudiates that it has not even coined a word to express it" (Bancroft 1949 dual citizenship was rejected because it blurred the lines of diplomatic protection and military obligation (Koslowski 2003) 5 ; it potentially decreased the incentive for assimilation and participation in the host country (Renshon 2005) , and it was thought to promote "disloyalty and deceit, divided allegiances and torn psyches" (Spiro 2002: 22) . The dislike for dual citizenship found expression in how countries treated their expatriate populations, often referring to them as "traitors" who have turned their backs on their countrymen.
Countries treated their expatriates "as prodigal sons and daughters who had abandoned their national family and who therefore should not be allowed to retain the original nationality" (Martin 2003, p.7) .
This view of dual citizenship has been challenged over the last half century as crossborder travel, marriage and adoption, and integrated trade and investment relationships have increased the desirability and utility of plural citizenship for individuals. (see figure 1 ). The anti-emigrant tide has also turned as countries of emigration have increasingly recognized that their diasporas are a potentially untapped asset. 6 Home countries have deployed an 5 Problems of conscription loomed large in country's hostility towards dual citizenship. During the 19 th century when countries attempted to staff armies via conscription dual citizenship presented a formative challenge. Fitzgerald (2002) notes that "one of the proximate causes of the war of 1812 was the impressment of British subjects, who had become naturalized US citizens, into the Royal Navy."
6 It should be noted that ties to expatriates may not be unambiguously good. The extension of citizenship rights to expatriates may lead external populations to have too much say in domestic politics. Levitt and de la Dehensa (2003) and Rubio-Marin (2006) raise troubling concerns when they reflect on the possibility that expatriate communities may be of sufficient size to influence the outcome of a democratic election. In a more thorough critique of expatriate rights, Benedict Anderson notes that external participants "rarely pays taxes in the country in assortment of strategies designed to maintain contact with their external populations.
Turkey, for example, encourages remittances by allowing émigrés to "buy off" compulsory government service with foreign exchange. The governments of Egypt and India both established bank accounts for foreign deposits where interest earned is tax-free. Sudan encourages remittances by offering an "incentive exchange rate" which provides a small premium above the official rate. The government of Mali provides up to $3,600 USD to returnees to aid in establishing new businesses. Sudan also makes funds available to returnees if those funds are used for home and business construction 7 .
A variety of countries also attempt to engage their diasporas more directly: Armenia, foreign nationals, and they host conventions and meetings to enhance a sense of home country engagement.
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These strategies attempt to create, recapture or cultivate feelings of membership in the nation; a nation that is tied to, yet is geographically disconnected from the state itself. The use of dual citizenship is especially important because diaspora engagement policies are designed to evoke a feeling of home country identity and connectedness, a feeling that will, hopefully, lead the emigrant to seek tangible connections to the homeland (Newland 2004; Gamlen 2006) . As David Fitzgerald remarked, "States deploy the language of nationalism precisely because migrants are outside state territorial borders but within the boundaries of the imagined nation" (Fitzgerald 2002 ).
The recent embrace of external populations by some countries is an explicit acknowledgement that expatriates are a resource to be leveraged for national economic betterment. A simple illustration of trends in dual citizenship and remittance behavior is compelling. While dual citizenship does not necessarily carry with it the right to vote it does provide the holder with the ability to travel under the homeland's flag and permits the émigré the same rights regarding property ownership as that afforded to residents. As seen in Figure 1 , by 2006, 84 countries allowed for dual citizenship-a provision whereby migrants naturalizing abroad maintain home country citizenship. 10 This over-time variation 9 It is important to note that not all large scale strategies for reconnecting and reintegrating expatriates have been successful. Ammassars and Black (2001) document the struggle that the International Organization for Migration's "Return of Qualified African Nationals" program had during its existence from 1983-1999. 10 I use the following criteria to determine the existence of dual citizenship rights for expatriates: whether upon naturalizing abroad a citizen retains or loses the right to hold the passport of his homeland and to own property in the home country. This may or (as is the case in a large number of countries) may not include retaining the right to vote or to stand for elective office. Coding dual citizenship right for expatriates was done through reference to national constitutions and related legislation, through documents held by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, through secondary source material and through phone calls to national embassies. This is the same strategy deployed by Freeman and Ogelmann (1998 Kerr (1996) has found that remittances increase consumption, lead to investments in technology, and in the growth of small and medium enterprises which, in turn, have a direct effect on economic growth. Woodruff and Zeteno (2010) found that remittances funded much of the micro-enterprise development that occurred in Mexico in the 1990s.
"promote and sustain the attachment of the people to the motherland" (Shain 1999, 662-3) .
In discussing the extension of dual citizenship by Latin American countries Itzigsohn (2000) and Goldring (1998) argue that the use of dual citizenship is more instrumental: by demonstrating that those living outside their homeland's geographic borders remain part of the extended community there is a hope that expatriates will remit and will return. Forner The use of dual citizenship fits into existing micro-economic models of remittance behavior-whether one believes that remittances are the result of altruism, self-interest or loan repayment. 13 Where does dual citizenship come in? From the view of self-interest perspective immigrants be more likely to remit or will remit more if they intend to return home and consume/invest the resources they have sent home. From this perspective dual citizenship makes the prospect of return-either permanent return or circular return-more likely as it decreases or eliminates the transactions costs associated with obtaining a visa. In a study of migrants living in Germany by Constant and Zimmerman (2007) found that immigrants who held a German passport-available only to German citizens (or dual 13 These arguments can be summarized as follows: altruism argues that migrants receive no direct economic benefit from remitting. Rather they remit because it increases the utility associated with helping out friends and family; migrants, from this point of view, receive positive utility from their family's consumption. The selfinterest perspective holds that remittances are investments sent by migrants intent upon returning home; investments that will be used for future consumption (e.g., Stark 1995) . The loan repayment argument combines elements of both altruism and self-interest and basically argues that remittances are a means of repaying the investment that friends and/or family have made in helping to facilitate the individual's initial migration (e.g., Poirine 1997). Yang (2011) provides a fuller description of these arguments. Chami, et al (2008) point out that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between these theories empirically because they are not mutually exclusive concepts. Empirical studies often find support for both theories because the independent variables attempting to operationalize these different theories can have multiple interpretations.
citizens) were more likely to engage in circular migration back to the home country-as compared with those immigrants who did not hold a German passport.
Additionally dual citizenship may facilitate larger flows of remittances because it encourages migrants to naturalize in their host country without sacrificing home country ties. Existing evidence is consistent with this conjecture. Jones-Correa (2001) Focusing on changes dual citizenship policies in Latin American countries, Mazzolari (2007) and Jones-Correa (2001) find that the provision of dual citizenship by the homeland led to an increase in naturalization rates among their expatriates residing in the United States and this, in turn, also lead to higher rates of employment and increased earnings. Mexico's attempts to connects to expatriates in the United States (voting rights, HTAs, DC)
are part of a general strategy to foster a diasporic identity which helps foster a "wide-range of government objectives that include guaranteeing the flow of remittances to Mexico, defending Mexican's rights in the United States, and possibly influencing the development of a lobbying group." He concludes by arguing that even if dual citizenship weakens ties between those that naturalize in the US, the strategy helps to engage second and third generation citizens of Mexican descent to still consider themselves Mexican. More generally Bloemraad (2004) argues that dual citizenship provides a mechanism strengthening ties with the home country. By allowing for naturalization without consequence, she argues that home country dual citizenship decreases the cost of cultural and political integration which, in turn, increases the migrant's ability to maintain transnational ties.
The preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses relating dual citizenship to immigrant return and remittances. First, at the micro level, expatriates from countries extending dual citizenship should be more likely to return and remit than expatriates from countries that do not provide these rights. Second, at the national level, countries that provide dual citizenship rights should be able to attract larger flows of remittances than those countries that do not extend dual citizenship. The next section describes the data used to test these hypotheses while sections 3 and 4 present the micro and macro level evidence.
Sample, Data, Measures
In In addition to the measure of home country dual citizenship described above, I include a set of variables to control for factors other than dual citizenship that may drive remittances over time and country. The first is the size of the country's diaspora as a share of the national population. 18 This variable proxies for the potential availability of external capital which could, all else equal, be remitted by émigrés to their homeland. It is important to note that this is an imperfect measure as while it accounts for the opportunity to remit it does not capture the ability of migrants to remit; that is, it does not capture the earnings or income of a country's diaspora.
Following Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005) I control for (logged) per-capita GDP in PPP terms and its square to capture differences in the average level of wealth in the migrant's homeland. The squared term helps to account for the possibility of selection on the part of migrants whereby migration-and difference in the rate of emigration-changes as countries undergo economic development. The WDI is also the source of data for the variable measuring the homeland's rate of exchange rate appreciation which helps proxy for the opportunity cost associated with saving money in the host country or remitting it back home.
Larger countries may, all else equal, have a larger number of emigrants. To control for the potential for these countries to generate large remittances I control for the recipient country's population. Drawing on Yang's (2011) work I also include a variable measuring the log of the estimated cost (in per capita US dollars) of natural disasters in the migrant's homeland. Migrants may be concerned with the transparency of financial system in their homeland and I proxy for this using the measure of capital account openness developed by Chinn and Ito (2008) . Finally, there is some evidence that a country's political institutions provide a signal about a country's level of economic transparency and corruption (Ahmed 2012 ). An imperfect but comparable indicator of institutional clarity is the country's level of democracy, which I measure using the POLITY measure of institutional democracy. All the country-level independent variables are lagged by one year to decrease the risk of simultaneity bias.
Dual Citizenship, Remittances and Return: Evidence from Migrant Surveys
The micro-level analysis begins in Table 2 where I draw on the collection of migrant surveys compiled by Bollard, et al (2011) and used in their study of remittances. To their baseline specification I add the dummy variable measuring the country's policy regarding dual citizenship (coded "1" if expatriates retain home country citizenship even after naturalizing abroad) lagged by one year. In addition, because of the potential for omitted variables I include a set of dummy variable for both the migrants host country (where the survey was conducted) and their homeland. The remittance models are estimated via OLS while the return models estimated using probit. All models include probability weights In columns 4 through 6 of table 2 I engage in the same exercise using a probit model to estimate the effect of dual citizenship on the immigrant's stated intention to return. The baseline probability of return in the sample is approximately ten percent. Migrants from countries offering dual citizenship are forty percent more likely than those from countries that do not provide dual citizenship to express an intention to return home. This is consistent with the argument made above: that at least one reason why sending countries embrace dual citizenship is because it will reduce the transactions costs associated with return migration. This effect shifts negligibly in specifications that include the amount a migrant has remitted or the variable capturing whether the home country offers dual citizenship.
In And again the inclusion of the macro-level control variables do not alter the substantive findings.
The second half of table 3 repeats this analysis using the Spanish survey substituting as a dependent variable a question asking whether the migrant intends to return to their homeland. In the Spanish sample the baseline probability of return is 8%. The marginal effect of dual citizenship on the probability of return is relatively consistent albeit substantively small-increasing the probability of return between two and four percent depending on the specification. Yet despite the small size of this effect dual citizenship does appear to have both a direct effect on remittances and an indirect one through the intention to return channel.
Remittances: Evidence from Panel Data
Thus far evidence at the individual level is consistent with the hypothesis advanced above, that dual citizenship increases the likelihood that an expatriate will remit and express an intention to return home. In this section I examine the relationship between dual citizenship and remittances at the national level; return migration is excluded because data on flow of returning migrants do not exist. However the use of aggregate time-series cross sectional data raises potential problems of identification as it is plausible that countries which already receive a substantial amount of remittances try to increase their remittance flow by introducing dual citizenship. To deal with the potential problems associated with simultaneity I employ instrumental variables and also estimate panel error correction models.
In To get a better sense of the magnitude of this increase I plot, in Figure 2 , the average Seeing that natives would soon be outnumbered, the French government extended dual citizenship rights to expatriates in the hopes not only that they would return, but also that they would continue to be engaged in the domestic political process.
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This suggests two additional and plausible instruments for dual citizenship. First, I
utilize a country's policy regarding multiple citizenship for its immigrants; that is, whether country i allows immigrants naturalizing there to renounce citizenship in their home country.
Allowing immigrants to maintain plural citizenship would, all else equal, proxy for more general policies towards multiculturalism and inclusiveness. given that that expatriate dual citizenship has historically been in conflict with a home land's ability to use a draft to staff its military, I include as an instrument the existence of 24 The process of democratization also brings with it pressures to expand, permit or encourage citizenship rights for one's expatriates as it provides an opening for groups to make demands on the political system. In a comparative study of dual citizenship rights Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010: 473) argue that "[A]lmost no state disqualified people from citizenship simply because they migration beyond territorial control. States become concerned when their emigrants acquire membership elsewhere." Within Africa dual citizenship has come about during periods of political liberalization via "strategic elite initiative, prolonged struggle by previously excluded groups, or both" (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010: 471) . mandatory conscription 27 in country i; this variable should be negatively associated with dual citizenship.
28 Table 5 28 I estimated a number of auxiliary regressions to test the assumption of excludability of these instruments. Conditional on the model in column 1 of table 4 none of these instruments have a statistically significant effect on remittances either individually or when entered as a set. This is due, for the most part, to the inclusion of the democracy variable which is highly correlated with both the extension of multiple citizenship to immigrants and to the conclusion of a truth commission. Mandatory conscription is never significant in auxiliary regression even after dropping the democracy variable. (table 5, columns 1 and 2) models including country fixed effects, year fixed effects and both set of fixed effects. Note that in the country fixed effects regressions the effect of dual citizenship is identified off of only those countries that change dual citizenship policy during the sample period. These results are reported in figure 4 and show that dual citizenship has a statistically robust and substantively significant impact on remittances; in only the IV model with year fixed effects does the 95% confidence interval come close to zero (the lower boundary is .053).
While the results in tables 4 and 5 provide consistent support for the hypothesis that dual citizenship enables governments to harness the economic resources of their diaspora, the use of panel data enables us to push the analysis a bit farther. In table 6 I estimate an error correction model (ECM) where the dependent variable is the change in remittances.
In estimating a full ECM model I include changes and lags of all explanatory variables used in table one; this enables me to capture the immediate but transitory effect of dual citizenship on remittances along with longer term effects of this policy. Table 6 contains the results of four different specifications of the ECM. All models include a set of country fixed effects to capture potential omitted factors, models two and four also include year fixed effects and models three and four are estimated via instrumental variables. 29 The effect of dual citizenship on the change in remittances is remarkably consistent across specifications with both the level and change in dual citizenship having a positive and statistically significant effect. In column one of table 6 the immediate effect of providing expatriates with dual citizenship rights-given by the coefficient on the contemporaneous change in dual citizenship-is 0.26 which translates into an immediate increase in remittances of almost thirty percent. The long-term effect-given by the coefficient on the lagged level of dual citizenship divided by the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable-shows the impact of introducing dual citizenship across future periods. 29 Because the ECM has two potentially endogenous variables-the lagged level of dual citizenship and the change in dual citizenship policy-I need two instruments. To maintain comparability I use number of border countries that have dual citizenship lagged one year (the same instrument used in table one) and the change in this variable entered contemporaneously. In both cases the F-test for instrument strength well exceeds the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10.
In column one this effect is quite large: an increase in remittances of over one hundred percent; numbers that are consistent with some of the results displayed in figure 2.
Conclusion
I argue that countries use dual citizenship to access a steady stream of international capital, capital that is available through their external populations through remittances and return migration. Using a variety of data sources and country samples I find not only that immigrant populations serve as an economic engine for their home country but also that national policies of emigrant engagement enhance that relationship. Of course countries want to maintain connections to their diaspora for reasons other than the access to capital.
Migrant communities can serve as advocates for the home country and can lobby their host countries for foreign assistance, preferential economic and military policies, and better treatment of immigrants from their countries. The extension of political rights by the home country helps maintain those connections and may provide better connections between host and home country governments.
This increase in the political rights afforded to external populations presents very real analytical and normative challenges. Analytically speaking, the expansion of rights to citizens-in fact the very use of the word citizen-is a challenge both to well established notions of state sovereignty as well as to the very definition of the nation-state itself. Dual citizenship effectively "decouples" citizenship from residence and disrupts the notion of a nation-state defined as a territory with a well-defined population sharing a common culture and history. Normatively, providing populations outside of legal borders political rights renders those borders less meaningful. Expatriate rights also raise complex issues so far as justice and fairness is concerned as these rights constitute the extension of a right without a substantive or meaningful obligation.
There is, of course, much to be done. In addition to cataloguing dual citizenship and voting rights for migrants, it would be valuable to identify other immigrant engagement strategies-strategies designed to strengthen the connection between emigrant and the home country. More can be learned about the causes of return migration from tapping the large (and growing) number of immigrant surveys that have been carried out in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Sweden. An analysis of these surveys could help clarify whether migrant engagement strategies are successful in harnessing those members of the diaspora that the home country most wants-those that embody human capital.
And more needs to be done to help make sense of the seeming disconnect between rights and duties afforded to national populations. The normative questions associated with allowing external populations to influence politics in the home country-and the desirability of trading these rights for economic flows-do not have easy or simple solutions. Results based on extensions of the models in columns 1 (OLS) and 2 (IV) of Table 4 with the addition of country and/or year fixed effects. 
